Cross-posted from the Hamilton Project blog:
Michigan has
now joined Oregon in proposing a
“Pay It Forward” student lending system in which students pay no tuition up
front and pay back a fixed percentage of their income after college. This
sounds very similar to an income-contingent repayment (ICR) system, which I
advocate in a recent Hamilton Project proposal.
But there is a key difference between Pay It Forward and ICR, and it’s one that
makes Pay it Forward unworkable as proposed.
In both the Michigan and Oregon
versions of Pay It Forward a borrower in repayment contributes a fixed
percentage of income for a fixed number of years. Her liability is not
denominated in dollars, as in a standard loan, but as a fixed number of
payments.
An aside on vocabulary:
economists call this a graduate tax –a tax on earnings for those who have gone
to college. It’s called a tax, rather than a payment, because a borrower
can’t buy her way out of the liability. The borrower is taxed for 25 years, even
if she has repaid the principal (plus interest) after a few years.
In the proposed Pay It Forward
systems, a graduate who does extremely well in the labor market will end up
repaying many times over the cost of her education, while one who does poorly will
pay much less. There is therefore cross-subsidization in this system, with the
“winners” paying some of the college costs of the “losers.”
Economic theory – and history –
shows that loans funded by a graduate tax won’t work because those expecting
high earnings won’t participate. Yale famously attempted a
graduate tax in the 1970s, lending money to its undergraduates and then having
them pay back a fixed percentage of their income for a fixed number of years.
What happened? Yale students who expected high earnings (e.g., aspiring
investment bankers) shunned the program, while those who expected low earnings
(e.g., aspiring artists) embraced it. Yale’s program spiraled into
insolvency.
This is a classic case of
adverse selection – borrowers who would be subsidized participate while those
who would subsidize stay away. This is unsustainable, as without the high
earners the system does not get enough payments to cover tuition costs. Because
of adverse selection graduate tax can work only if participation is mandatory,
with everyone forced into the borrowing pool.
Another interesting aside: this
is similar to the dynamic in insurance markets, which collapse if sick people
buy coverage and healthy ones go without. Adverse selection is why coverage is
mandatory under the Affordable Care Act, and it’s why health policy wonks have
so carefully tracked the enrollment of young, healthy people in the new
insurance exchanges. The young, healthy participants cross-subsidize the older,
sicker participants, just as high earners subsidize low earners in a
(mandatory) graduate tax.
Neither the Oregon nor Michigan
plan requires all borrowers to participate in their programs. I (and other
economists) therefore predict that the programs, as currently proposed, will be
brought down by adverse selection.
A minor tweak to Pay It
Forward, as outlined in my Hamilton proposal, will
maintain its positives (simplicity, insurance against bad draws in the labor
market) while eliminating the negative (unsustainability). The change is this:
denominate debt in dollars, and let borrowers pay their debt. If a student
borrows $25,000 and (due to pluck and luck) earns enough that she has paid back
the principal plus interest after just ten years, she will stop paying into the
program.
If a borrower instead runs into
hard times and still owes money after 25 years, the balance will be forgiven.
In this way, Pay It Forward and my income-contingent repayment proposal both
subsidize low earners. The key is that my modification keeps high earners
from fleeing the program, transforming Pay It Forward it into a universally
attractive program rather than one that appeals primarily to low earners.
As pointed out by Theda
Skocpol, universal programs are politically
more resilient than those that primarily benefit poor people.
Keeping high earners in Pay It Forward will give it the broad-based political
support it needs to survive.
My tweak also makes transparent
the cost of Pay It Forward. Some borrowers cannot, given their low earnings,
pay off their loans. Their forgiven debt is the cost of the program, and is
borne by all taxpayers. Without my tweak, the costs of Pay It Forward are
disguised by the fairytale that it is self-funding. When high earners shun the
program and it collapses, the taxpayers will be on the hook to bail it out. The
financial cost, in the end, is the same, but the political cost is much higher,
since the program will be deemed an expensive failure.
With the political momentum
behind Pay It Forward, we have a rare opportunity to restructure and reimagine
how we pay for college. Get the design right, and we will have a financially and
politically sustainable system for funding college that works for students and
taxpayers. Get the design wrong, and we will have a spectacular flameout that
sets back reform for another generation.
